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 Case study on fake news through Agrokor 
Fake news, a term that is often mentioned in Croatian media increasingly fills the media space 
and encourages controversy over the Agrokor issue. For this reason, as the outcome of 
my thesis I included the analysis of the media content. With this analysis I will see whether, 
and to what extent fake news appear in three types of media, the television station that I 
selected is the national television - the Croatian Broadcasting Company (HRT), as the press 
representative I have chosen one of the largest national daily newspapers Jutarnji list and 
Internet portal that was selected is Index.hr, all for research purposes. I will carry out a 
research of public opinion on the extent to what the public believes the media and information 
that is being broadcasted on Agrokor, what will be checked with the questionnaire. Fake news 
is present in all three types of media, and people are not fond of trusting the media, while 
television gained the greatest popularity and trust of people, which is the most relevant 
medium of research. 
Keywords: fake news, Agrokor, Croatian Radio and Television (HRT), Jutarnji list, Index.hr. 
 
Študija primera lažnih vesti na primeru Agrokorja  
V hrvaških medijih pogosto najdemo izraz ''lažne vesti'', ki vse pogosteje zavzemajo medijski 
prostor in spodbujajo razprave na temo koncerna Agrokor. Zato je cilj moje raziskave analiza 
medijskih vsebin. Analiza naj bi pokazala prisotnost in obseg lažnih novic v treh vrstah 
medijev. Tako sem za raziskavo televizije izbrala hrvaško nacionalno televizijo – Hrvatska 
radiotelevizija (HRT), za tisk sem izbrala Jutarnji list, enega največjih nacionalnih dnevnih 
tiskov in za analizo spletnih medijev sem izbrala portal Index.hr. Raziskovala bom javno 
mnenje in na podlagi ankete ugotovila in odgovorila na naslednjo hipotezo: v kolikšni meri 
javnost verjame v informacije o Agrokorju, ki jih najdejo v medijih. Lažne vesti so prisotne v 
vse treh vrstah medijev – na televiziji, na portalih in v tisku. Raziskava je pokazala, 
anketiranci v Republiki Hrvaški seznanjeni so s pojmom lažnih vesti. Medijem na splošno 
verjame zelo malo ljudi, največ pa zaupajo televiziji in lahko zaključimo, da je televizija 
najpomembnejši medij.  
Ključne besede: lažne vesti, Agrokor, Hrvatska radiotelevizija (HRT), Jutarnji list, Index.hr. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
As a topic of my Bachelor thesis, I have chosen fake news because it is a term that is often 
mentioned in the media, especially in a relationship with Agrokor. This topic prompted me to 
investigate to what extent fake news appear in the conjunction with the company, which is 
also the goal of my thesis. 
Fake news is a term increasingly referred to in the context of media and media objectivity, 
which is entirely against the principles of journalistic discourse. Journalistic objectivity, 
which is imperative for journalistic work, and is necessary for providing public information, 
becomes questionable if there are fake news in the media. 
First part of the thesis is theoretical, in which I deal with the terminology of fake news. They 
represent a negative term involving the publication of untrue facts, and as such are not a 
phenomenon that has recently appeared. The history of fake news is much longer and I will 
clarify that in detail, in the beginning of my work. I will present the link between fake news 
and the media, and how fake news are spreading faster thanks to the Internet and social 
networks. 
Publishing of a negative facts is often associated with propaganda that does not necessarily 
have to be negative, although it is usually understood as such, and its fundamental principles 
are closely related to the characteristics of fake news. So, in the theoretical part of the thesis, I 
introduced the notion of propaganda as a contemporary phenomenon, alongside the main 
propaganda principles by which the presence of fake news in the media is proved. The 
principles of propaganda are the base for the second part of the thesis - research. 
The methodology I chose is an analysis of media content that will present fake news on the 
example of Agrokor, in the printed media (Jutarnji list), television (HRT) and on the internet 
portal (Index.hr). At the end of the second part of the thesis a quantitative method will be used 
to test a hypothesis, formed in the following way: people do not trust the media and Agrokor-
related information published in the media. The research part of the thesis will end with the 
conclusion of the research. 
At the very end of the thesis, in chapter 5, I will give a conclusion to my research, which will 
include conclusions of theoretical and research work together, but also concluding thoughts, 
followed by a list of literature and contributions.  
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2 FAKE NEWS 
The purpose of this chapter is to define fake news, identify its distinctions from similar terms, 
its function in the media, as well as the way it is connected to other concepts that will be 
presented in this paper.   
2.1 EXPLANATION OF THE TERM 
The concept of fake news, which is the subject of this paper, is not the same as the concept of 
fake news used in its past, i.e., only a few years ago. Nowadays, this expression stands for a 
phenomenon that incorporates fake news into journalistic discourse, while in the past it was 
news in satirical literature. Then, “fake” represented hybrid genre that carried out a piece of 
information in a satirical manner, clearly indicating to the public that the information is not 
real. Therefore, its falsity was indicated to a greater extent than the falsity of today’s 
untruthful information (Vozab 2017, p. 3; Klein and Wueller, 2017; Allcott and Gentzkow, 
2017). 
Fake news refers to deliberately published false facts whose aim is to deceive the readers, or 
as the authors, David O. Klein and Joshua R. Wueller have defined it: “Fake news is an online 
publication of intentionally or knowingly false statements of facts“ (Klein and Wueller, 2017, 
p. 7). This definition is supported by Macquarie Dictionary as well, where fake news is 
defined as “wrong information, i.e. fraud, published on the Internet for political purposes or in 
order to encourage user activities, as well as inaccurate information transmitted through social 
media (Macquarie Dictionary
1
 in Vozab 2017, p. 3). 
By having defined fake news in that manner, the respective authors have quite limited its 
meaning to the online publications only. Yet, its presence in other types of media needs to be 
pointed out as well, which is supported by Webb (2017), the author who, on the other hand, 
has associated it with the use of data that is customized for every individual on the basis of 
their needs, as they want to be exposed to news and facts that interest them and attract their 
attention. Such an explanation of fake news was also endorsed by the authors Allcott and 
Gentzkow (2017, p. 3), who have presented fake news as “texts that are deliberately and 
verifiably wrong,” and as such can mislead the readers. As they claim, fake news is cheaper 
                                                          
1
 Macquarie Dictionary. (2016). Word of the year.  
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than the real news and make a profit from the fact that people are prone to the news that 
confirm their point of views (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p. 3). 
Since the notion of fake news is the central term of this master’s thesis, it is of great 
importance to clarify the difference between fake news, defamation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, violation of intellectual property rights, and other possible forms, thereby 
contributing to the comprehensive explanation of the term – what fake news stands for, what 
it represents, and what it relates to.  
Defamation, with regard to fake news, is considered gossip if it is not audio or video 
recorded, while recorded defamation is defined as libel or slander. Libel or slander is subject 
to law and legal decision-making, and an individual who is experiencing a violation of his or 
her rights should confirm the existence of evil intention (actual malice). On the other hand, 
the person who published that information has a greater chance of defending themselves if he 
or she proves that it was satirical. However, it is important to mention that satire is subject to 
the law as well.  
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is similar to defamation and represents a common 
criminal offence that is regularly conducted against the people who publish fake news. These 
people then negate the allegations by saying it is satire, which has become legal after the 
Falwell case.   
Intellectual property infringement, or violation of intellectual property rights, is related to 
people who publish news about someone without authorized rights. In fake news, we often 
encounter brand names in promotional purposes of their work, and not the promotion of 
products or services of that brand or person (Klein and Wueller, 2017).  
Unlike defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intellectual property 
infringement, and other related but not the same foundations of untrue information, the vital 
motive of fake news is money. More precisely, the money-motivated fake news is newspaper 
articles that become viral on social media and generate remarkable revenue from advertising, 
and accordingly – profits. The second motive is ideological: it is associated with each 
ideology of an individual and could be related to political propaganda, as well as the spread of 
ideological news, with the aim of bad influence and the creation of bad media images of the 
people in question.  
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To distinguish fake news from the above-mentioned concepts, there are several rules defined 
by Jowett and O’Donnell (2012): 1) unintentional journalism mistakes, as a recent report; 2) 
rumours that are not generated by the newspaper article; 2) conspiracy theories (by definition 
they are difficult to verify as true or fake because they are created by people who believe in its 
veracity at the very beginning); 4) satire that is unlikely to be understood as factual; 5) false 
statements of the politicians; 6) reports that are distorted or misunderstood, but not completely 
false (Jowett and O 'Donnell, 2012, p. 5). 
Fake news, just like propaganda, depends on the time dimension, as for both terms it is easier 
to prove the truth or disprove the false statement in a shorter period of time. Moreover, both 
terms are conditioned by communication space that can be opened or closed, which in the 
case of media would represent media platform where false, untested, and untruthful facts are 
being published in order to mislead the consumer of information. The high similarity between 
these two terms is also supported by the Šiber’s definition of propaganda, which defines it as 
a planned and intentional act directed at changing the control of attitudes in order to create 
preconditions for a certain manner of behaviour (Šiber, 1998, pp. 292–297; Allcott and 
Gentzkow, 2017).  
2.2 FAKE NEWS AND MEDIA 
Although fake news is not new, but it is historical phenomenon dating back to the period of 
the French Revolution, its importance in the media is constantly increasing. Nowadays, when 
most of the information and news are seen on Facebook and when politicians, as well as other 
public figures who shape public opinion, are sending instant messages via Twitter, it is more 
than necessary to discuss fake news in the media. By doing so, social media are not 
considered as the media but as the hybrids that do not produce their own content. Instead, they 
represent a platform that shares the content originally published on other platforms (Nenadić 
2017, p. 16). According to Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), several reasons caused an increase 
in the importance of false news: First, barriers to entry in the media industry have dropped 
precipitously, both because it is now easy to set up websites and because it is easy to monetize 
web content through advertising platforms. Because reputational concerns discourage mass 
media outlets from knowingly reporting false stories, higher entry barriers limit false 
reporting. Second, social media are well-suited for fake news dissemination, and social media 
use has risen sharply: in 2016, active Facebook users per month reached 1.8 billion and 
Twitter’s approached 400 million. Third, Gallup polls reveal a continuing decline of “trust 
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and confidence” in the mass media “when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately, 
and fairly.” This decline is more marked among Republicans than Democrats, and there is a 
particularly sharp drop among Republicans in 2016. The declining trust in mainstream media 
could be both a cause and a consequence of fake news gaining more traction. Fourth, one 
measure of the rise of political polarization: the increasingly negative feelings each side of the 
political spectrum holds toward the other. 
Media organizations, which struggled in 1920’s to become institutions independent of 
political and economic interests, have now become dependent on digital mediators that shape 
the media and communication environment (Nielsen and Gnater, 2017
2
 in Nenadić, 2017, p. 
16). On the other hand, we are facing a decreasing number of journalists in the editorial 
offices, yet the public’s expectations of their work are increasingly greater. The number of 
news is constantly growing, and nowadays being the first one to publish them is a big 
challenge, so the journalists do not verify the sources and do not take into consideration other 
points of view, which results in incomplete or misleading information in the media. Thus, the 
journalist, as the voice of the public and transmitter of true and objective news, has become 
the spreader of fake news (Nenadić, 2017, p. 17). The inability to obtain alternative 
information enables the shaping of the public according to the wishes of authorities, but also 
the turn of the public to alternative sources of news. Interestingly, sometimes even when 
people discover the truth, they turn to lie-based propaganda, or as we call it, in this case, fake 
news (Šiber, 1998, pp. 296–297; Nenadić, 2017, p. 17). 
Hence, the question here is how to prevent fake news and increase the quality of information 
and their authenticity? I believe that media without fake news, the world without defamation 
and gossip, as well as the life without propaganda based on the utopian idea are certainly 
worth the effort of decreasing the number of incomplete, misleading and untruthful 
information, regardless of their precise name or shape. The vital part is the same for all – a 
false fact.  
Today, in the time of the Internet and the ubiquity of information, media literacy has become 
of utmost importance. Recent studies of Pew Research Centre have shown that even 63 % of 
adults get informed via social media, and when it comes to policy awareness, as many as 61 
                                                          
2
 Nielsen, R. K. and Ganter, S. A. (2017). Dealing with digital intermediaries: A case study of the relations 
between publishers and platforms. 
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% of popularly-called millennium generation relies on the sources republished by Facebook 
(Gottfried and Barthel, 2015
3
 in Spratt and Agosto, 2017, p. 17). For these reasons especially, 
it is of great importance to provide adolescents and young people, as well as the older 
generations, with education on media literacy. It particularly applies to the way the text 
should be read, how to critically approach its content, how to check the sources, how to 
recognize the tone of the article, which political orientation media and journalists belong to, 
and whom they advocate. Only when educating young people and creating media-literate 
generations, the fight against fake news will become possible. It is important to mention that 
social media users are not even aware that they are in some kind of “protective balloon”, 
which means that they get only the information they prefer, i.e., they have liked, read, and 
followed. Information is tailored according to their previous likes, comments, friends, twits, 
etc.; thus, they are always surrounded by like-minded people, but who are not necessarily the 
right-minded ones (Spratt and Agosto, 2017, pp. 17–21).  
Insufficiently regulated media, especially the Internet and social media that represent the 
platforms for republishing news and sharing them with just one click, have also contributed to 
the existence of the creators of fake news. They have arisen due to the huge appetites for as 
many likes, follows, and shares as possible, and they achieve such aspirations by 
sensationalist titles. To clarify, both “real” news creators and fake news creators have the 
same goal – as high reach and number of clicks, follows, and readings as possible. However, 
what does not prevent them from creating false content is poor regulation and poorly designed 
punishment laws. Journalists earn for their living by writing, and nowadays, it is interesting 
that when almost everyone can become a journalist, educated ones are often being put in a 
very unenviable position. Nonetheless, two completely independent research conducted by 
BuzzFeed and Guardian have shown that even more than 100 web pages which have 
published fake news were led by a group of teenagers from a small city Vales in Macedonia, 
as well as that a web page Endingthefed.com, responsible for even four of ten most popular 
fake news, was led by 24-year-old Romanian. Moreover, the fact that even some of the most 
famous news sources are not deprived of fake news is supported by the proof that even 
                                                          
3
 Gottfried, J. and Barthel, M. (2015). The Evolving Role of News on Twitter and Facebook. 
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 in Allcott and Gentzkow, 2016, p. 6; Spratt and Agosto 2017). 
To summarize, Allcott and Gentzkow (2016) state that there are two reasons for spreading 
fake news: The first is pecuniary: news articles that go viral on social media can draw 
significant advertising revenue when users click to the original site. This appears to have been 
the main motivation for most of the producers whose identities have been revealed. The 
second motivation is ideological. Some fake news providers seek to advance candidates they 
favour. The Romanian man who ran endingthefed.com, for example, claims that he started the 
site mainly to help Donald Trump’s campaign (Townsend, 2016 in Allcott and Gentzkow,  
2016, p. 7). Other providers of right-wing fake news actually say they identify as left-wing 
and wanted to embarrass those on the right by showing that they would credulously circulate 
false stories (Dewey, 2016
7
, Sydell, 2016 in Allcott and Gentzkow,  2016, p. 6–13). 
Unregulated media, unverified sources, and seemingly innocuous news can certainly pose as 
dangerous for those directly involved, but the indirectly involved as well. Hence, it is 
important to recognize the distinction between fake news, propaganda, gossip, and other types 
of defamation. Propaganda, as a broader concept that affects all life spheres, surely serves a 
basis of fake news, since the very motives behind these terms are the same – stating false facts 
in order to achieve higher goals.  
  
                                                          
4
 Subramanian, S. (2017). Inside the Macedonian Fake -  News complex. 
5
 Townsend, T. (2016). Meet the Romanian Trump fun behind a Major Fake News Site.  
6
 Sydell, L. (2016). We Tracked Down a Fake – News Creator in the Suburbs.  
7
 Dewey, C. (2014). This is Not an Interview with Banksy.  




In this chapter, propaganda and the explanation of its term will be portrayed in detail. A 
special emphasis will be put on the negative view of propaganda, which is the most spread 
one in the public and closely related to fake news. Theories on propaganda will be explained 
as well, which will serve as a foundation for the second part of this paper, as one of the 
concepts presented below will be used in a research aimed at proving the existence of fake 
news in one contemporary example. In other words, propaganda theory will represent this 
paper’s tool in an attempt to demonstrate the existence of fake news by analysing the media 
with respect to one specific case. Yet, to sum up, propaganda dating from the 17
th
 century will 
be explained, as well as the way it has become a contemporary phenomenon.  
3.1 EXPLANATION OF THE TERM  
Propaganda is a term that has often occurred in literature. A lot of attempts at its defining has 
been made, and a lot of authors have scrutinized it, tried to unravel its phenomenon, and 
observed its development during the history, as well as the role it obtained in each new 
historical period. Despite numerous changes and interpretations, their origin is common: it 
comes from Latin word of pro - pagare, “to sow”. However, its greatest role has been obtained 
nowadays, with the emergence of mass media (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 2).  
The term propaganda dates from 22
nd
 June 1622, when it was mentioned for the first time in 
the context of the holy community for the propagation of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
community was called Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, which is the abbreviation of 
the “Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda”, founded by the Vatican with special 
intention of “leading the pagans from the darkness into light by preaching and giving an 
example” (Šiber, 1998, p. 300; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, pp. 2–75). 
The propaganda outside of church usage emerged only at the beginning of 20
th
 century, and 
according to Šiber (1998), its history has been grounded on three mutually connected 
elements: 1) increased need of developed civilization and creation of national countries to win 
the “battle for human consciousness”; 2) increasingly sophisticated means of communication 
used to reach and provide all the people with propaganda message; 3) increased understanding 
of propaganda psychology and the application of its discovering. Not until the modern times 
have these three factors enabled its mass application (Šiber, 1998, p. 301). 
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Today, propaganda is a term often put in the negative context as something unfair, which is 
the consequence of the Roman Catholic Church’s propaganda whose purpose was spreading 
its religious views into the new world and posed as an open opposition of Protestantism.  
Likewise, the political propaganda we know today has started with French Revolution and its 
usage for the Revolution purposes was based on the providing the people with messages 
which would make them connect with the ideology. Having roots in French Revolution, 
propaganda and its synonyms are nowadays often approached to as a lie, fraud, manipulation, 
mind control, and even brainwash.  From the public relations’ point of view, a lot of people 
associate it with spin and fake news as well (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 1–29).  
Spin is often used when we discuss the manipulation of political news, therefore Sproule 
(1994) has defined propaganda in the following way: “Propaganda represents the work of 
large organizations or groups to win over the public for special interests through a massive 
orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and 
lack of sound supporting reasons” (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, p. 8). However, it was not 
until the World War II and Nazi action in Germany when propaganda has acquired such a 
negative connotation. Yet, the negativity is not present in the definition, supported by the very 
definition provided by Šiber (1998): “The propaganda is planned and intentional act directed 
at changing the control of attitudes in order to create preconditions for a certain manner of 
behaviour” (Šiber, 1998, p. 292).  
No matter if someone advocates positive or negative connotation of propaganda, numerous 
authors have agreed that propaganda represents communication process and that it affects the 
public. Hence, the authors Jowett and O’Donnell has offered a definition focused on the 
aspect of the communication process: “intentional, systematic attempt of shaping the 
perception and manipulating the cognitions and direct behaviour in order to achieve the 
answer that fosters propaganda’s wanted intention” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). A 
similar approach to studying and perceiving the public in propaganda is supported by Terence 
H. Qualter (1962) as well: “Propaganda, to be effective, must be seen, remembered, 
understood, and acted upon ... adapted to particular needs of the situation and the audience to 
which it is aimed” (p. xii). Influencing attitudes, anticipating audience reaction, adapting to 
the situation and audience, and being seen, remembered, understood, and acted on are 
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important elements of the communicative process” (Qualter8, 1962, p. xii in Jowett and 
O'Donnell 2012, p. 6). 
When it comes to policital propaganda, one must not overlook the closely related economy 
and the role of propaganda in the economic sector, i.e. economic propaganda. Economic 
propaganda is any form of presentation or promotion of a product or a service that is 
conveyed by some of the forms of mass media, paid by a certain advertiser. With its help, the 
company is able to control its messages and direct them at its target groups. If the company 
decides to use economic propaganda, it has to choose the messages it will convey carefully, as 
well as how, since not every propaganda turns out to be successful (Economic propaganda, 
n.d.).  
There are numerous variations of propaganda, almost as much as the number of ideologies 
that have existed over the time. However, one of the most widespread ones takes into 
consideration the context of propaganda’s comprehension, thus dividing it into three types – 
black, white, and grey (Šiber, 1998, p. 296).  
Black propaganda – it has emerged in Nazi Germany and refers to the introduction of false 
statements and lies. Apart from Germany, other powerful countries, such as Great Britain, 
were not deprived of black propaganda as well. This type of propaganda requires the 
readiness of the public to accept the source and content of the message, while the author of 
these messages needs to be acquainted with the public well for messages not looking 
suspicious. Also, apart from being secretive, it is described as misleading information, which 
is both the characteristic and synonym of fake news. In this way, the misleading information 
unifies the propaganda and fake news. As such, it comprises of news deliberately designed to 
weaken the opponents, whose authors are journalists who are someone’s allies (allies of state, 
certain organizations, or political parties) (Šiber, 1998, p. 296; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, 
pp. 18–24).  
On the opposite side, white propaganda represents both truth and clear and truthful source of 
information. This kind of propaganda reveals facts transparently, as it believes that the very 
strength of these facts will persuade people into the justifiability of a certain policy. Also, by 
                                                          
8
 Qualter, T.H. (1962). Propaganda and Psychological warfare.  
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using this kind of propaganda, one believes that, at some point in the future, they will benefit 
from its truthfulness (Šiber, 1998, p. 296). 
Grey propaganda is placed between these two types of propaganda and represents a so-called 
custom truth. The source can but does not have to be identified, and this alone makes the 
truthfulness of the information questionable (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 20). 
Furthermore, according to Šiber (1998), grey propaganda corresponds to contemporary 
propaganda practice. It is based on true information but selected and presented to a certain 
group in accordance with a desirable, previously determined direction. Presented facts are 
usually intentionally chosen, unlike the white propaganda. However, all these facts are true, 
which makes it different from black propaganda. It could be said that information is 
transmitted skilfully by professional writers who know how to shape and present this 
information (Šiber, 1998, p. 296).  
Despite the different kinds and types of propaganda, they all have the same goal in common. 
Their goal, which will be proved in the following chapters of this paper, is to meet the needs 
and wishes of the person or entity who shapes the propaganda news, and not those of the 
public.  
3.2 THEORIES ON PROPAGANDA 
Propaganda is a complex concept that dates way back to the past and is comprised of 
numerous tools. In this chapter, the emphasis will be placed on the introduction and 
description of propaganda techniques that will be illustrated in the Agrokor case study, a 
research in the second part of this paper. In other words, these techniques will serve as a tool 
for research. 
In the study of propaganda, there are ten basic elements which will be explained in detail 
below.  
1. The value system and propaganda goals – the purpose of each propaganda is to 
influence the people in order to adopt propaganda’s beliefs through a systematic group 
of knowledge, values, and beliefs. To be successful, propaganda needs to be 
acquainted with a system of norms and values that regulate the desirable and 
undesirable behaviour of a society. Propaganda has also an obligation towards the 
organization or institution it is representing, which refers to maintaining legitimacy 
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and ensuring the legitimacy of its activities. As Joseph Goebbels, a Nazi propagandist, 
said, “propaganda has no method, but only a purpose – to win the masses”, which is a 
goal of each propaganda message (Šiber, 1998, pp. 308–309). 
2. The prevailing features of the political situation – in order to be successful, 
propaganda needs to understand the climate of action, which means that it has to 
worry about the time and place within it operates, as well as the mood of the public in 
question. The propaganda analyst must be aware of the current public issues, what is 
the orientation of the relevant groups, which political parties are included, and the 
whole political situation of a country where propaganda takes place and exerts 
influence. Moreover, it is of great importance to know if that time period is turbulent 
or stable. If the situation is unstable, the public is more prone to accept simple, 
unambiguous, and often extreme messages, while in stable times political actions 
should be diversified, as then there are numerous subjects that shape the orientation of 
the public.  
3. The bearer of propaganda message – there are two most important components of 
propaganda: what was said and who said it. The bearer of propaganda message is 
usually organization or institution with a propagandist as its leader, i.e. the front face 
of propaganda on whom depends the success of the message delivery to the public.  
4. The structure of the propaganda organization – it requires central, powerful 
authority and consistency of messages, it includes the relationship with media, as well 
as their skillful use and, when possible, their control. It is also important to analyse the 
intra-party organization and the focus of the propaganda message, where two 
orientation directions could be seen: propaganda focused on the leader’s charisma or 
focused on the problem and party’s program.  
5. The targeted public –  the publicity chooses the public that will serve it well. In 
modern times, propaganda is directed towards specific groups in order to achieve its 
reach and goals, while traditional propaganda used to address the masses. The public 
addressed by propaganda is the referent propaganda, i.e. specific part of the public that 
knows the problem better than the others and is, therefore, more interested in it.  
6. The use of media – modern propaganda uses all types of media: from books to radio, 
television, Internet, e-mails, and all other available channels. The characteristic of 
propaganda lies in the fact that different messages go through different communication 
channels but come from the common source. Although the point of the message 
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remains the same, the source of propaganda gets acquainted with the media, adapts the 
message to each communication channel, and therefore gains the control of 
information (Jowett and O 'Donnell, 2012, pp. 289–303). 
7. The use of special techniques for maximizing the effect – Qualter (1962) advocates 
that a successful propaganda message must comply with four rules: it has to be seen, 
understood, memorized, and acted upon (Qualter
9
 in Šiber, 1998, p. 312). Although 
the choice of techniques is almost unlimited, which is confirmed by the fact that one 
of the techniques is music, in order to use each one of them the propagandist needs to 
know the public’s wishes and needs, and the public needs to accept the propagandist 
as a credible source.  
8. Counter-propaganda – counter-propaganda could be found in almost as many forms 
as propaganda, but some of the forms are graffiti, theatre, literature, and film. It can be 
as active as propaganda too; however, the analyst needs to determine if the public is 
aware of the purpose of counter-propaganda, i.e. that it exists in order to confront the 
propaganda.  
9. Public reactions towards propaganda messages – propaganda is a process that has 
its duration and requires research on public responses. Yet, the most important 
research is related to the behaviour of the public; as an example, whether the public 
comes to the elections (Jowett and O 'Donnell, 2012, pp. 289–306; Šiber, 1998, pp. 
308–313). 
10. Effects and evaluation of propaganda – the most important effect refers to whether 
the purpose of propaganda is fulfilled, which is at the same time the ultimate result of 
propaganda. Error detection and analysis are crucial for future actions, preventing 
possible disasters, and predicting unpredictable situations (Šiber, 1998, pp. 308–313; 
Jowett and O 'Donnell, 2012, pp. 289–306). 
3.3 PROPAGANDA AS A MODERN PHENOMEN 
Propaganda is a form of communication that has the ability to shape changes and wants to 
produce an answer from the public, as its direction is the direction of people, masses, the 
public. Due to its mass orientation, the process of propaganda is complex and includes 
propaganda agents, various media, and a social network, starting with an institution and 
                                                          
9
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ending with a possibility of public’s response or a response from a target audience within the 
public. The intention of propaganda is to influence the people so to adopt the beliefs and 
attitudes that are actually the beliefs and attitudes of those who shape them, while the goal can 
also be introducing a new pattern of behaviour in order to contribute money, join groups, or 
demonstrate for a cause (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, pp. 291–366). 
Propaganda is most visible in war periods, and media was its weapon in the past as it is today. 
Propaganda does not choose the manner, as it uses all available media for the spread of 
various messages, which are then adjusted to the communication channel – from the press, 
radio, fax, television, and films to the Internet, e-mail, and social media (Jowett and 
O'Donnell, 2012, p. 296). 
Due to the emergence of radio in the 30s’, powerful governments could propagate their 
ideologies worldwide, as well as in the remote areas. The powerful development that 
followed, which was related to communication satellites, fostered international growth and, 
consequently, the influence of television. In addition, faxes too became widespread, so they 
served as a new channel for the spread of propaganda messages.  
Fast technological changes in the 20
th
 century have forced propaganda to undergo massive 
changes, and the Internet has become the key tool for institutions and individuals to send the 
messages worldwide. Unlike other types of media, the Internet is almost impossible to 
control, and it has the ability to send messages to a great number of people instantly. By each 
post on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, as well as on other social media, people actually 
share propaganda content – information intended for the one who reads it to ponder upon it or 
to behave in a way which contributes to propaganda’s initial intentions. As it could be seen, 
propaganda exploits the media, and propaganda messages spread to media’s members, as well 
as the targeted public whose support is sought. By that, propaganda stops being ethically 
neutral idea or content (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012, pp. 359–366; Kaye, 2013).    
The propagandists choose the type of media by which they want to reach to the public, and if 
the media are not in their possession, propagandists risk having information published in an 
inappropriate manner. In order to be effective, media messages need to be homogenous and 
with a consistent purpose, while the lack of media control (the case with the Internet) means 
the lack of control over message homogeneity. Nowadays, media prefer sensationalist titles 
and news, which enable both the critics and implausible, unverified sources to become the 
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spreaders of propaganda messages. Likewise, due to the Internet and social media, there is a 
much greater worldwide exposure and free subsequent media coverage, which is also one of 
the results of lack of control. In recent popular revolutions, institutions, and demonstrations 
worldwide, social media has played an important role in mobilizing, informing, and 
influencing public opinion, as well as shaping the consensus of events around the world 
(Kaye, 2013). The role of social media is great, as three crucial paradigms have shaped it:  
1. Opinion leaders who can influence the public due to their social media’s position 
2. Small groups of people that can include opinion leaders, propaganda agents, or both 
3. People who deliberately or accidentally spread the rumours via social media (Jowett and 
O’Donnell, 2012, p. 365).  
New media allow social media not to create their own news but to represent a media’s agent, 
a platform that republishes the news of other sources. For this reason, we are witnessing today 
an information and propaganda war that is happening in front of us, i.e. a global audience, on 
a daily basis (Kaye, 2013).  
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4 AGROKOR CASE STUDY 
This part of the paper will present the existence of fake news in the media, as well as test the 
hypothesis relevant for this thesis, which is the following: „People do not trust the media and 
Agrokor-related information published in the media“.  
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
After the theoretical, introductory part of this thesis, the presentation of fake news and the 
hypothesis testing will be demonstrated on the Agrokor case study. The case study will be 
grounded on the media analysis, i.e. the daily newspaper Jutarnji list, Croatian Radio 
Television HRT, and the articles of Croatian news portal Index.hr. In order to make the case 
study as relevant as possible, a survey will be used to investigate the extent to which people 
believe in the media and information that is being presented about Agrokor.  
In this paper, one event for each media type will be chosen and will serve to prove the 
existence of fake news. This methodology is selected due to a great amount of information 
and events associated with the concern. Hence, with the aim of proving the existence of fake 
news according to the type of the media, the following events will be chosen: 
Fake news in the press will refer to the analysis of the event that happened on 31
st
 October 
2017, when Jutarnji list claimed that at the beginning of 2017 Agrokor had not experienced 
problems and that the food industry had been ready for an IPO (an initial public offering). 
That information was taken from the blog of Ivica Todorić, without further research and 
analysis of its credibility. Yet, that information was false, and even Ivica Todorić refuted it by 
signing the contract in December 2016, stating that an IPO has not happen and not shall it 
happen. What is more, Todorić signing that Agreement did not go unnoticed by media that 
published it and attached the copies of the contract as well (Todorić, 2017c; Jutarnji list, 
2017). 
Fake news on the Internet will refer to the event on 8
th
 October 2017, when Ivica Todorić 
stated that the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia has nationalized a private company. 
This was republished by other media too, but the falsehood of that statement lies in the fact 
that on 7
th
 April 2017 Todorić signed a statement, by which he declared that he was giving the 
company he had built to the Republic of Croatia (Todorić, 2017b; O.I.N., 2017; Brozović, 
2017). 
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Fake news on television will refer to the event that took place on 28
th
 September 2017, when 
Ivica Todorić used his blog to claim that Martina Dalić had threatened one of the board 
members. The later investigations conducted by SOA (the Security and Intelligence Agency 
of the Republic of Croatia), has found that such e-mails did not exist and that the accusation 
was false (Todorić, 2017a; Raić-Knežević, 2017).   
4.2 FAKE NEWS IN THE MEDIA 
Fake news will be illustrated on the basis of a printed edition of Jutarnji list, the Croatian 
daily newspaper. Fake news also refers to a blog that was cited and republished in Jutarnji list, 
which was used by Ivica Todorić to claim that the food industry, as part of the Agrokor 
Group, was ready for the IPO at the beginning of 2017. Why would such news be fake, 
especially if we take into consideration the fact that food businesses can indeed achieve the 
greatest growth? The truth is that the Agrokor Sustainability Plan has promised to generate up 
to 473 million euros in free cash flow during 2018 and 2021 (Trstenjak, 2018). Nonetheless, 
the news that food industry is ready for the IPO is fake because, in December 2016, Todorić 
stated that the IPO has not happen and not shall it happen, which was supported by the copies 
of the Agreement that was published, among other media channels, by N1 television on their 
official sites (see Picture 1). This contract was signed by Ivica Todorić with his Agrokor 
Group, as can be seen in the following picture (Todorić, 2017b; N1 televizija, 2018). 
Picture 4.1:  Agreement of Cancellation of possible negative effects of IPO Agrokor project  





Source: N1 television (2017). 
Therefore, by republishing posts from Todorić's blog without mentioning the well-known 
contract’s existence or asking Todorić to provide an explanation, Jutarnji list republished fake 
news, as well as other media that did not investigate the situation. 
As basic elements of defining propaganda have been thoroughly explained in the previous 
chapters, propaganda will be illustrated below on the basis of the above-mentioned event, 
published in Jutarnji list: 
1. The value system and propaganda goals – the purpose of Ivica Todorić’s 
propaganda is to convince the public that Agrokor was stable and that there were no 
indications of his failure. Likewise, he wants to convince the public that the food 
industry, as a part of Agrokor, was ready for the IPO (an initial public offering), which 
would pose as desirable due to Agrokor’s issues and great debts. In other words, the 
debt would be deconstructed, and Agrokor would be presented as in “good business 
shape” (Todorić, 2017b). 
2. The prevailing features of the political situation – the period in which propaganda 
operates is unstable, and propaganda has been skilfully directed towards the public and 
backed up with various analytical data that have provided fake news with credibility.  
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3. The bearer of propaganda message – the bearer of propaganda message is Ivica 
Todorić, the owner of Agrokor Group.  
4. The structure of the propaganda organization – the propaganda organization has a 
charismatic leader, Ivica Todorić, who leads the organization and conveys messages in 
the interest of his own company.  
5. The targeted public – the targeted public is comprised of all Agrokor employees, as 
well as other people. The aim is to convince the public that Agrokor has not yet 
collapsed and that the Government is deliberately ruining it and presenting it as not 
liquid.  
6. The use of media – as a leader of modern propaganda, Ivica Todorić uses the blog as 
a media channel, which is then cited by all other media platforms, even daily press 
Jutarnji list (Jutarnji list, 2017). 
7. The use of special techniques for maximizing the effect – according to Qualter 
(1962), successful propaganda message needs to comply with four rules: it has to be 
seen, understood, memorized, and acted upon. Propaganda of Ivica Todorić fulfils all 
the preconditions (Qualter
10
 in Šiber, 1998, p. 312). 
8. Counter-propaganda – counter-propaganda is not very active at the time. On one 
side, there is the Government of the Republic of Croatia, while on the other side there 
is Ivica Todorić, each leading their own propaganda. They have been denouncing each 
other, so that even Todorić himself argued that the Prime minister, Andrej Plenković, 
was implementing fake news”. That saying could be found on Todorić’s blog, and 
consequently, in Jutarnji list (Jutarnji, 2017).  
9. Public reactions towards propaganda messages – the public response is not 
precisely known; however, the notion of Agrokor’s importance is somewhat supported 
by the Ipsos Plus CRO Demoskop’s survey for October 2017. As that was the month 
when the blog post “Agrokor was not having problems at the beginning of 2017, the 
Government is who did the damage” was published and shared by media, Agrokor 
consequently became the most important subject for even 47,1 % of citizens 
(Promocija plus, 2017).  
10. Effects and evaluation of propaganda – the most important effect is the fulfilment 
of propaganda’s purpose. It is successful because Jutarnji list, as well as other media, 
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has not analysed blog’s facts even once, nor have they referred to the previously 
mentioned “Agreement on bearing possible negative effects of the Agrokor d.d. IPO”, 
closed by Ivica Todorić and Agrokor d.d. (Jutarnji list, 2017).  
4.3 FAKE NEWS ON TELEVISION 
In this paper, fake news on television will be illustrated by the example of an event that 
happened on 28
th
 September 2017, when Ivica Todorić used his blog to write an article called 
“Here’s who and how she threatened”. In this article, he claimed that Martina Dalić, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia, threatened one of the board members, which was also 
published by Dnevnik, the main news program of Croatian Radio Television, and television 
presenter Goran Brozović (Annex 1). Having analysed propaganda elements in previous 
chapters (see chapter 3.2), the elements of fake news will be presented below.  
Ivica Todorić refuses to sign Lex Agrokor, which is the Law for the Extraordinary 
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the Republic of Croatia. This 
law would pause Agrokor’s business from operating for a year, after which Agrokor would 
return to the market as a “healthy” company. This type of company freezing means 
suspension of debenture activation, suspension of interest payment, and suspension of 
principal payments. In other words, everything that burdens suppliers, especially small ones, 
would be suspended, which would provide cash flow to suppliers. Consequently, they could 
enter the retail chains, which could then start producing and even perhaps exporting 
(Brozović, 2017). Yet, the crucial issue is that Todorić had to sign Lex Agrokor due to 
insufficient Group’s cash resources for salaries, despite his numerous attempts at finding 
another way to solve the problem. In order to gain more time, he even stated that Martina 
Dalić used threats to force him sign it (Brozović, 2017).  
1. The value system and propaganda goals - if the focus is put on the value system of 
Agrokor Group, especially on the respective situation, it could be said that Ivica 
Todorić, the owner of the Group, believes that Agrokor is his private property which 
the Government wants to control by forcing him to sign Lex Agrokor. At the same 
time, Ivica Todorić is aware of the importance of Agrokor, which greatly influences 
the stability of Croatian economy due to its specific role as it is present in almost 
branch of economy. Therefore, the purpose of Todorić’s propaganda is to persuade the 
citizens that the Republic of Croatia is working against him and that it does not want 
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to help him but want to acquire his private property. Moreover, he wants to convince 
people that the Government does not have the understanding for his requests, which is 
the reason why they threaten him. In other words, by talking about alleged threats, he 
is trying to do everything in his power to protect his interests and to delay Lex 
Agrokor (Todorić, 2017a; Brozović, 2017).  
2. The prevailing features of the political situation - at the time, the public problems 
are associated with the fear of job losses and worries for the future of Croatian 
economy, Croatian fields, woods, water, and every other resource. Likewise, the 
crucial problem is related to the absence of payments to small, local Croatian 
suppliers, which stands as another reason why economic growth is not stagnating but 
decreasing. The period of the propaganda is a rough time for everyone associated with 
the Group. In the Agrokor debate, the Government engages as well by bringing up Lex 
Agrokor, while the public is concerned and untrustworthy. In such confusing period 
for all citizens, the Todorić’s blog is coming out and thoroughly describing how 
threats made by Martina Dalić: “(…) On 28th March (…), Martina Dalić sent a 
threatening e-mail to one of the board members of Agrokor, at 02:30 a.m., by which 
she threatened with arrests if Lex Agrokor would not be signed. Let her denounce that, 
if she dares”. He goes further by explaining that these threats did not happen just once: 
“(…) at the meeting of Antonio Alvarez, Ante Todorić and Martina Dalić, in the 
building of Croatian Government, Martina Dalić threatened Ante Todorić with arrests 
of him and his whole family if Lex Agrokor would not be signed (…)” (Todorić, 
2017a). 
3. The bearer of propaganda message - the bearer of propaganda message is Agrokor 
Group, along with its founder, Ivica Todorić, who is writing and advertising himself 
via his blog.  
4. The structure of the propaganda organization - the leader of propaganda action is a 
powerful authority, Ivica Todorić, whose propaganda is based on his charisma. 
Likewise, he attracts the attention due to both his and his organization’s importance at 
the national level. In addition, he fosters the relationship with media by writing posts 
for his blog that have attention-drawing, sensational headlines. Yet, media republish 
them without verifying the statements because they cannot reach Ivica Todorić, who is 
in hiding. 
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5. The targeted public - the targeted public is comprised of all adult citizens of the 
Republic of Croatia, the opposition, and everyone connected to the Group (from small 
suppliers to Group’s employees). His aim is to address the masses, create citizens’ 
trust, and turn them against the banks that want debts to be paid off and the 
Government, who is trying to find a solution that would keep the state from 
bankruptcy.  
6. The use of media – again, Ivica Todorić uses the blog as a media channel, whose 
purpose is to reach wide masses. The purpose is being achieved as his blog posts are 
republished by all kinds of media - radio, television, portals, press, etc. Therefore, 
Ivica Todorić uses the same channels to convey different messages, which later 
journalists share in their initial state. What is more, even Croatian Radio Television 
broadcasted Todorić’s diary as truth, without examining its credibility.  
7. The use of special techniques for maximizing the effect – if we rely on Qualter’s 
(1962) four rules for propaganda success, it could be concluded that Todorić’s blog 
complies with all four rules: the message is seen, understood (the blog is written in 
such manner to be understood by everyone), memorable (sensational headlines and 
shocking messages of well-known politicians guarantee that such information will be 
remembered for a long time), and acted upon (Ivica Todorić acts and shares his 
thoughts and attitudes via his blog) (Qualter
11
 in Šiber, 1998, p. 312).  
8. Counter-propaganda – counter-propaganda is present on a daily basis, as it is created 
by satirical Facebook groups “Di su pare?” (Where is the money?) and “Čača se 
vraća” (Daddy is coming back) and visible in the movie “Gazda” (The Boss), whose 
main character is Ivica Todorić. Yet, the public is not aware of the counter-propaganda 
but accepts these messages as an escape from the every-day life. In other words, they 
perceive the counter-propaganda as the humour whose purpose is to ease the stress.  
9. Public reactions towards propaganda messages – propaganda is a process that lasts 
and requires research on the public responses. According to the research conducted by 
the agency Ipsos Plus Cro Demoskop for September 1017, it is clear that only 9,4 % of 
citizens considered Agrokor as the most important subject (Ipsos plus, 2017). 
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10. Effects and evaluation of propaganda – the propaganda effect was not successful in 
the end due to the necessity of signing the Lex Agrokor. Moreover, even Krešimir 
Macan, PR expert and the advisor to Prime Minister from 2018, stated: “(…) at that 
moment, he was aware of the fact that he would never return to Agrokor as its owner 
(…)” (Jutarnji list, 2017b).  
The event is considered fake news because the accused Martina Dalić subsequently urged 
Prime Minister, Andrej Plenković, for the investigation of her e-mails in order to find out 
whether she had threatened one of the Agrokor’s board members. SOA, the Security and 
Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Croatia, investigated the event and examined all the 
Internet communication of Minister Dalić, yet they claimed there are no threatening messages 
found, which was also mentioned in Government’s announcement (Raić-Knežević, 2017).   
However, damage to Minister Dalić is great, as her minister’s reputation has been 
irretrievably destroyed in the period between the time when the blog was published and the 
very end of the investigation. A contribution to her reputation’s damage was made by 
Dnevnik’s presenter on Croatian Radio Television as well, who did not mention that the 
information is not verified, nor did they ask Minister Dalić to provide an explanation 
(Danas.hr and Hina, 2017).  
4.4 FAKE NEWS ON PORTALS 
Fake news on the Internet will be analysed on the basis of what happened on 8
th
 October 
2017. That day, Ivica Todorić published a blog where he claimed that the Prime Minister has 
nationalized his company, which is fake news republished by Index.hr too. In the core of this 
fake news is the fact that on 7
th
 April 2017 Todorić wrote in his announcement that he gave 
the company he had built to Croatia (willingly): “(…) forty years of myself have I invested in 
the construction of both whole Croatia and region. Therefore, I am a proud man now for 
today, by signing this, I have given to Croatia everything I had built (…)” (D.Ma, 2017). 
Having access to the older announcement but still having republished the newer one, 
regarding the nationalizing the company, in its initial form and without a warning that the 
credibility of the content is questionable and unverified, media has published fake news.  
1. The value system and propaganda goals – the goal of propaganda is to keep the 
company, blame the Government, and convince the citizens that the company was 
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abducted. The advocated value system includes Agrokor governing the Croatian 
economy and influencing its future.  
2. The prevailing features of the political situation – political situation is complicated 
at the time, which is when Ivica Todorić publishes his new blog post, called “Prime 
Minister of Croatia, you have nationalized a private company”. In this post, which was 
entirely and without any changes, additions or explanations republished by Index.hr on 
8
th
 October 2017, Todorić stated the following: “(…) I, as its owner, am prevented 
from exercising any property rights, which is the consequence of the unconstitutional 
and unlawful Act that was proposed by your Government and voted for by your 
Parliamentary majority. I do not believe that you do not know an individual is free 
only if they can exert their rights and their property is sacred. (…)” (Todorić, 2017c).  
3. The bearer of propaganda message – the bearer of propaganda message is Ivica 
Todorić.  
4. The structure of the propaganda organization – the propaganda organization 
consists of the Group’s owner, Ivica Todorić, who uses his blog as a diary in order to 
present his side of the story.  
5. Targeted public – the targeted public is comprised of all Croatian citizens. As already 
being said, Todorić wants to convince everyone in both his innocence and injustice 
done by the Government (abducting his company). At the same time, his target group 
is also the employees of Agrokor Group, i.e. around 60 000 people who were working 
for Agrokor at that point (D.Ma, 2017)  
6. The use of media – Ivica Todorić uses his blog as a media channel, which is then 
cited by all other media. Therefore, other media become blog’s agents, since the 
truthfulness of its content is not examined.  
7. The use of special techniques for maximizing the effect – to maximize the effect, 
Ivica Todorić uses the blog, a kind of a diary through which he conveys his point of 
view regarding Agrokor.  
8. Counter-propaganda – it is present on a daily basis, due to the content of satirical 
Facebook pages “Di su pare?” and “Čača se vraća”.  
9. Public’s reactions towards propaganda messages – the public’s opinion on 
propaganda messages could be seen in chapter 4.5. Likewise, a research conducted by 
Ipsos Plus Cro Demoskop for October 2017 has shown that 46,1 % of Croatian 
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citizens considered Agrokor to be the most important subject, which makes it the most 
important event in Croatia in October 2017 (Ipsos plus, 2017).  
10. Effects and evaluation of propaganda – the propaganda effect is to accuse the 
Government of not caring about job losses. Likewise, the propaganda effect is related 
to the situation with Sberbank, which now charges the Government, and not the 
Group. More precisely, Sberbank argues that the Prime Minister has abducted the 
Group, which is the reason why he should be responsible for the consequences as well. 
This is also supported by Prime Minister’s statement: “(…) according to Sberbank 
ratings, Croatian Government has nationalized Agrokor Group, which is why it has to 
pay for Agrokor’s debt toward the Russian bank (…) I think that their attorneys are 
very good at reading, which was the point of Extraordinary Administration. Therefore, 
I am rejecting the nationalization thesis. Nationalization is something else. This is a 
law that gives space to Extraordinary Administration in a limited time frame (Ćimić, 
2017).   
4.5 FAKE NEWS AND PUBLIC 
This part of the paper will illustrate the analysis of public’s perception on fake news. For this 
purpose, a short survey was created in order to test the following hypothesis:  
H1: People do not trust the media and Agrokor-related information published in the 
media. 
An online survey was conducted via social network Facebook by using the 1ka application 
(see Annex A). Taking into consideration that anonymous survey was being administered in 
the period from February 2018 to 9
th
 May 2018, it does not stand as a representative sample of 
the population of the Republic of Croatia due to the inadequate data.  
During the time of conducting the research and writing the thesis, certain limitations were 
encountered. First and foremost, the survey was administered among friends and colleagues 
on the social network Facebook, which does not represent a real state of affairs in Croatia. 
Secondly, the research was conducted only in the Republic of Croatia. Yet, it would certainly 
be interesting to conduct the research in the entire region in which Agrokor operates, 
especially in Slovenia.    
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The next limitation is related to the event that took place on 9
th
 May 2018. On that date, the 
survey was closed because of the new events on Agrokor. The preface was opened by 841 
persons, while 9 persons opened the survey, which represents the data inadequate for the 
further analysis. Furthermore, via the final data only 164 answers were obtained, which does 
not stand as a representative sample of the population. 
Picture 4.2: The number of responses on survey 
      Final stage:  
      Fill out the questionnaire: 144 
     Partialy fill out: 20 
     Valid results: 164 
 
Source: translated from 1ka. (2018). 
The reason behind it is that the survey was administered via Facebook, and despite the 
anonymity, it did not have a big reach due to various factors. One of the most notable factors 
was an Agrokor-related event that shook both Agrokor and Croatian Government, and it 
refers to previously undiscovered compromised e-mails of Martina Dalić, the minister, which 
were published in the public on 9
th
 May 2018 by Index.hr, the online news portal. Due to 
these e-mails, the survey needed to be closed in order to avoid changing the public’s opinion 
and, consequently, the survey’s results.  
Briefly, e-mails between Minister Dalić and other Agrokor decision-makers started to emerge 
in the public in segments on a daily basis. Consequently, the affair has not yet concluded at 
the moment of writing the master’s thesis, although in the meantime, on 14th May, the 
Minister Dalić gave an irrevocable resignation and admitted that the e-mails were true and 
that she was their author. However, she defended herself by saying that the motive was the 
well-being of Croatia and its economy (Ćimić, 2018).  
By analysing the survey according to sociodemographic features, the following could be 
concluded: 
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Table 4.1.: Gender and Educational structure of the Sample 
 (n=164) 
 Value n % 
Sex Male 73 45 





Uneducated 0 0 
Primary school 1 1 
Secondary school 38 23 
Higher education 22 13 
Master studies 100 61 
PhD 3 2 
 
The sample includes 45 % of men and 55 % of women, and the majority of the participants 
have a master’s degree, while the least participants have completed only the elementary 
school. 
Table  4.1: Age characteristics of the Sample 
 (n=164) 
 Value n % 





to 20 2 1 
21 – 40 139 85 
41 – 60 22 13 
 61 + 1 1 
 
The majority of the participants are aged between 21 and 40, while the least of them are older 
than 61 (only one person).  
The following data illustrate the term fake news and the media trust: 
Table 4.2: The answer to the question „Have you heard of fake news?“ 
(n=162) 
Value n % 
Yes 160 99 
No 2 1 
 
The majority of the participants (160), which makes 99 %, are familiar with the term fake 
news, while only 1 % of the participants are not familiar with the term.  
Table 4.3:  Answer to the question „Do you recognize fake news in the media?“  
 (n = 160) 
Value n % 
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Yes 135 82 
No 25 15 
 
The majority (82%) of the participants think that they can recognize fake news in the media, 
while 25 participants (15 %) do not recognize fake news in the media.  
Table 4.4: Answer to the question „how many times did you meet the fake news in the 
media?“  
(n = 160) 
Value n % 
Never 4 2 
Once 2 1 
Two to five times 24 15 
Five to ten times  24 15 
More than ten times 106 65 
 
The majority (65%) of the participants have encountered fake news in the media, while only 1 
% of them have encountered it only once.  
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Table 4.5: Answer to the question „In what section of the media do you think that fake news 
appear most frequently?“  
(n = 148) 
Value n % 
Politics and economy  72 44 
News 23 14 
Crime 1 1 
Life, health and lifestyle 48 29 
 
72 participants (44%) believe that fake news mostly appears in the section of economy and 
politics, while only 1 % of the participants believe that the largest number of fake news is 
contained in the Crime & courts section.  
Table 4.6: Answer to the question „in which type of media is the most infidelity 
information?“  
(n = 144) 
Value n % 
Radio  0 0 
Television 10 6 
Printed media 9 5 
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Portali 61 37 
Social media 64 39 
 
When it comes to the media channel that conveys fake news to the greatest extent, the largest 
number of the participants (39%) chose social media, while 37 % of them believe that it is the 
news portal that conveys fake news the most. None of the participants think that the radio 
broadcasts fake news, while only 10 participants (6 %) believe that fake news could be seen 
on television as well. Moreover, only 9 participants (5 %) believe that untruthful information 
appears in the press.  
Table 4.7: Answer to the question „in which type of media is the most verified, truthful 
information?“ 
 (n = 142) 
Value n % 
Radio 30 18 
Television 54 33 
Printed media 36 22 
Portali 12 7 
Social media 10 6 
 
When choosing the media channel that publishes verified and true information, the highest 
number of the participants (54), i.e. 33 % of them, believe that television is the media that 
broadcasts truthful information. Furthermore, 22 % chose the press, followed by the radio that 
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proved to be the right choice for 18 % of the participants. Only 7 % of the participants think 
that news portals are the most truthful media channel, while only 6 % chose social media. 
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics of the value that shows how many respondents belive in the 
thruth of the claims in the mentioned media vrijednosti (1 strongly disagree… 5 I completely 
agree) 
 N min max Aritmetička 
sredina 
Std. odklon 
Jutarnji list 144 8 0 2.9 0.76 





137 11 4 3.0 0.94 
 
Participants do not agree with all of the above statements more than they agree, for the mean 
value of these statements is lower than 3 or 3. Simply put, this means that it is not true that 
participants believe in Jutarnji list and Index.hr. Most participants agree with the statement 
(mean 3.0) that truthful information appears on Croatian Radio and Television (HRT).  
Table 4.9: Answer to the question  Have the media ever changed the perception or opinion of 
a particular event and / or a person?“  
(n = 142) 
Value n % 
Yes 98 69 
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No 27 19 
I don't know 18 13 
 
The largest number of participants (69 %) stated that their opinions and attitudes towards 
some event and/or topic were changed by the media, while only 18 participants (13 %) did not 
know if their opinion or perception of a particular event and/or person were altered due to the 
media. On the other hand, 27 participants (19 %) disagreed with the statement. 
Table 4.10:  Answer to th question „Do you think that there was a fae news in the media about 
Agrogor Group?“  
(n = 143) 
Value n % 
Yes 121 74 
No 0 0 
I don't know 22 13 
 
The majority of the participants, as many as 74 % of them, believe that media did publish fake 
news regarding the Agrokor Group, while not one participant believes there was no fake news 
in the media. Finally, 22 participants (13 %) do not know whether fake news was represented 
in the media.  
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Table 4.11: Answer to the question „Do you think that the media have offended reputation 
with reporting about Agrokor?“  
(n = 143) 
Value n % 
Yes 67 41 
No 48 29 
I don't know 28 17 
 
The largest number of participants (47 %) think that the media have damaged Agrokor’s 
reputation by reporting, while 29 % of participants disagree with that. Yet, 28 participants (17 
%) said that they were not sure.  
Table 4.12: Answer to the question  „Do you belive that Ivica Todorić is really behind Ivica 
Todorić's blog?“ 
 (n = 143) 
Value n % 
Yes 58 35 
No  85 52 
 
Asked whether they believe that Ivica Todorić is indeed behind Ivica Todorić’s blog, 35 % of 
the participants are convinced, while 85 participants do not agree with the statement.  
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Table 4.13: Answer to the question „Do you belive that Ivica Todorić is telling the thruth in 
his blogs?“  
(n = 143) 
Value  n % 
Yes 23 14 
No 120 73 
 
The largest number of the participants (73 %), i.e. 120 of them, do not believe Ivica Todorić is 
saying truth in his blog, while 14 % agree with the statement.  
4.6 CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
The survey shows that respondents in the Republic of Croatia are familiar with the concept of 
fake news, indicating that as many as 99% of respondents have heard about this term. When 
we talk of recognizing fake news in the media, statistics say that fewer people recognize them 
than those who heard the term - 82% of respondents recognize fake news in the media. 
The largest number of respondents (65%) experienced fake news in the media, most of whom 
spotted them within politics and economy sections (44%). 
According to respondents, the type of media that appears to have the biggest number of untrue 
information are social networks, which are followed at a rate of only 2 percentage less by the 
portals. On the other hand, respondents believe that the most verified and true information 
appear on television (18%). They confirmed that on the next question, giving the largest 
support to the Croatian national radio and television (HRT), between other types of media. 
The hypothesis “People do not trust the media and Agrokor-related information published in 
the media” is therefore confirmed. Agrokor can be based on the information provided by 
respondents who most likely believe the media, and the most trust is shown towards 
television. At the same time, most of the respondents (69%) believe that media changed the 
perception of a certain event and/or a person. The respondents also reported that the most fake 
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news are connected with Agrokor (74%). It is important to mention that not one interviewee 
consider that the media did not place fake news about the Agrokor, but 13% of people do not 
know whether such news on this subject were released to the public. Distrust with the media 
and information that the media outlets sell to the public is quite large, which results in 41% of 
respondents claiming that the media hurt Agrokor's reputation by reporting fake news. There 
is a lack of trust towards the media, but it is important to note that despite the fact that the 
respondents feel that media are harming the reputation of Agrokor and that false statements 
are made, trust in Ivica Todorić is lacking as well. Even 52% of people believe that behind the 
blog of Ivica Todorić is not Ivica Todorić, and as many as 52% of respondents believe that his 
blog posts are not true.  
Conclusion is that people trust the media and information that is being broadcasted by the 
media about Agrokor too a small extent.  
 
  




5 CONCLUSION  
This bachelor thesis is dealing with fake news in the media on the example of Agrokor, and to 
what extent do people believe in information that is being broadcast in the media about 
Agrokor. 
The aim of this work was to find out the presence of fake news in the media on the example 
of Agrokor. Moreover, through the analysis of media, in three types of media - daily press, 
television and internet portal, fake news about Agrokor were spotted. 
In my research, I was interested in linking fake news to every kind of media where I 
concluded that fake news appear on Croatian national television where Ivica Todorić's blog 
was published in the central news show claiming that former Minister Martina Dalić 
threatened one of the board members, but by browsing Martina Dalić’s mails, security 
intelligence agency found claims fake. The presence of fake news is apparent in the printed 
edition of Jutarnji List, where they report that the food industry, which was a part of Agrokor, 
was ready for the IPO, which is a fake news since Todorić had previously said that the IPO 
will never happen as there is a copy of the contract which Ivica Todorić signed with its 
Agrokor group. Fake news are present on the portal Index.hr as well, where it is alleged that 
Ivica Todorić's company has been abducted from him, while it is known that he had 
previously stated in the announcement that he voluntarily handed the company to the state. 
In the end, this thesis was grounded on the hypothesis “People do not trust the media and 
Agrokor-related information published in the media”, where survey concluded that citizens 
have a little trust in the media, but at the same time, although they do not consider Ivica 
Todorić a truth-stricken person, they are aware that the media harmed Agrokor and Ivica 
Todorić's reputation. Expectantly, the smallest number of people believe in social networks as 
the relevant media, while the vast majority of respondents believe that television has the most 
relevant information. 
Based on the research thesis concludes that a large number of people are familiar with the 
term of fake news, but that they do not know to recognize them in the media, i. e. they do not 
know exactly what fake news can relate to. 
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Continuation of research is foreseen within the repetition of a survey where it would be 
interesting to see how much people believe in information regarding the new events in 
Agrokor's affair and resignation of Minister Dalić as well as fact that the portal Index.hr 
discovered the affair. Moreover, I see further research in the widening of fake news research 
on radio as a medium to which a large number of respondents (33%) gave positive feedback 
when we are talking about the revelation of truthful information. 
  




Tema mojega diplomskega dela so lažne vesti v primeru koncerna Agrokor. Moje diplomsko 
delo je sestavljeno iz dveh delov, teorijskega in raziskovalnega. 
V prvem delu sem predstavila fenomen lažnih vesti, oziroma namenoma objavljene 
neresnične podatke, s ciljem zavajanja bralcev. Ta pojem obenem predstavlja tudi fenomen, ki 
v medijski diskurs namenoma in preverljivo vpleta lažna besedila. Je treba poudariti, da so 
lažne vesti nekaj drugega kot je npr. kleveta, namerno povzročanje čustvene bolečine ali 
kršitev intelektualne lastnine. Tisti pojmi so samo nekatere izmed možnih oblik neresničnih 
informacij. Lažne vesti se od ostalih omenjenih pojmov največ razlikujejo v motivu za objavo 
neresničnih informacij, in to je denar. V nadaljevanje teorijskega dela sem predstavila 
propagando, ker je ta pojem, enako kot lažne vesti, odvisen od dimenzije časa in 
komunikacijskega prostora. Zaradi francoske revolucije propagando danes najpogostejše 
dojemamo kot nekaj negativnega. V tem času je propaganda postala sopomenka za laž, 
prevaro, manipulacijo, ki jih danes povezujemo z lažnimi vestima. Če o lažnih vesti govorimo 
kot sodobnem fenomenu, jih v vsakem primeru moramo povezati z mediji, posebej zaradi 
družbenih mrež, ki ne predstavljajo medij, ampak so hibrid brez lastnih vsebin in služijo kot 
platforma za objavo novic. Nedavne raziskave Pewresearch Centra so pokazale, da se celo 
62% odraslih ljudi informira po družbenih mrežah, in celo 61% generacije, ki ji popularno 
pravimo milenij, se o politiki informira po Facebooku. Prav iz takšnih razlogov je izjemno 
pomembno, da bodo ljudje medijski pismeni, kar pomeni, da znajo kritično brati, preveriti vir 
in ton članka ter regulirati medije. Neregulirani mediji, nepreverjeni viri in na prv pogled 
preproste vesti, so lahko zelo nevarne za vključene akterje, in zato je zelo pomembno, da v 
medijih znamo najti lažno vestjo. Skupni cilj vseh propagand, vkljub različnim vrstam in 
različnim tipologijam, je zadovoljiti potrebe in želje osebe, ki oblikuje propagandno novico, 
in ne javnosti. To je najbolj razvidno, če si ogledamo propagandne tehnike: 1. Vrednostni 
sistem in cilji propagande - da bi propaganda bila uspešna, mora poznati sistem norm in 
vrednosti, ki regulirajo zaželeno in nezaželeno družbeno vedenje; 2. Prevladujoče 
značilnosti politične situacije – da bi propaganda bila uspešna, mora skrbeti o času in 
prostoru delovanja ter o razpoloženju ciljne javnosti; 3. Nosilec propagandnega sporočila – 
nosilec propagandnega sporočila je ponavadi organizacija ali inštitucija, ki jo vodi 
propagandist; 4. Struktura propagandne organizacije – zahteva centralno, močno avtoriteto 
in konzistentnost sporočil ;5. Ciljna javnost – javnost, kateri je propaganda namenjena, 
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pozna problem boljše od drugih javnosti in za njega kaže več zanimanja. 6. Uporaba medijev 
– moderna propaganda uporablja vse vrste medijev (knjige, radio, televizijo, splet, e-pošto); 7. 
Uporaba posebnih tehnik za maksimizacijo efektov – Qualter (1962.) meni, da je za 
uspešno propagandno sporočilo treba upoštevati štiri pravila: mora biti videna, mora biti 
razumljena, mora se zapomniti in na njeni podlagi treba delovati (Qualter v Šiber 1998, str. 
312). 8. Kontrapropaganda je lahko enako aktivna kot propaganda; 9. Reakcije javnosti na 
propagandna sporočila – reakcija javnosti je najpomembnejši del raziskave. 10. Efekti in 
vrednotenje propagande – izpolnjen namen propagande je najpomembnejši učinek in 
obenem skrajni rezultat propagande.  
V raziskovalnem delu sem analizirala medijske objave povezane z Agrokorom in razložila 
lažne vesti na primeru televizije, tiskanih medijev in portala. V nadaljevanju sem s pomočjo 
kratke ankete preverila hipotezo, da ljudje na zaupajo medijem in informacijam v zvezi z 
Agrokorom. Lažne vesti Jutarnjega lista, v katerem Ivica Todorić trdi, da je na začetku leta 
2017 prehranska industrija kot del koncerna Agrokor, bila pripravljena za IPO. Prehranska 
industrija ni bila pripravljena za IPO, ker je decembra 2016 Todorić povedal, da se IPO nikoli 
ni niti ne bo zgodil, čemu je priča tudi kopija pogodbe, ki jo je med ostalimi mediji, na svojih 
uradnih straneh objavila tudi televizija N1. Ivica Todorić je podpisal pogodbo s svojim 
podjetjem Agrokor. Glede lažnih vesti na televiziji, sem raziskala blog, oz. članek z naslovom 
„Evo tko je i kako prijetio“, napisan 28. 9. 2017, v katerem Ivica Todorić trdi, da je Martina 
Dalić, potpredsednica Vlade Republike Hrvaške, grozila enemu izmed članov uprave, novico 
pa so objavili v glavnem Dnevniku Hrvaške Radio televizije. Gre za lažno vest, ker je 
optožena Martina Dalić naknadno prosila za pregled njene e-pošte, da bi ugotovili resnico 
glede obtožb, da je grozila enemu izmed članov uprave Agrokora. Od premijera Andreja 
Plenkovića je zahtevala, da raziskavo celega dogodka prevzame SOA, varnostno – 
obveščevalna služba Republike Hrvaške. SOA je pregledala spletno komunikacijo ministrice 
Dalić in ugotovila, da ni bilo nobenih grozljivih vsebin, kar je v svojem sporočilu prenesla 
tudi Vlada. Kot primer lažnih vesti na spletu sem bolj natančno analizirala blog napisan 
8.10.2017, v katerem Ivica Todorić trdi, da je predsednik vlade nacionaliziral njegovo 
kompanijo, kar je objavil tudi Index.hr. Gre za laž, ker je Todorić v sporočilu 7.4.2017 
naznanil, da državi (prostovoljno) daje v roke kompanijo, ki jo je gradil: „(…) Četrdeset 
godina sebe uložio sam u izgradnju cijele Hrvatske i regije, stoga sam danas ponosan čovjek 
jer sve što sam izgradio danas sam svojim potpisom predao hrvatskoj državi (…)" (Indeks.hr, 
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2017). Mediji so objavili lažno vest, brez opozorila, da gre za neresnično informacijo. Mediji 
so dobesedno objavili vsebino bloga, brez preverjanja virov in verodostojnosti informacij.  
V zadnjem, raziskovalnem delu, sem s pomočjo kvantitativne metode preverila hipotezo, da 
ljudje ne verjamejo medijem in informacijam v zvezi Agrokora, ki se objavljajo v medijih. 
Hipotezo sem preverila tako, da sem v obdobju od februarja 2018 do 9. maja 2018 s pomočjo 
aplikacije 1ka na Facebook stran postavila online anketo. Na podlagi ankete sem sklenila, da 
so anketiranci v Republiki Hrvaški seznanjeni s pojmom lažnih vesti (celo 99%), ampak je 
nekaj manj tistih, ki jih lahko opazijo v medijih. Po mnenju anketirancev je največ 
neresničnih informacij na družbenih mrežah, sledijo jim portali s samo dvemi odstotnimi 
točkami manj. Po drugi strani, anketiranci menijo, da je največ preverjenih in resničnih 
informacij na televiziji (18%), kar so tudi potrdili na naslednjem vprašanju in med tremi 
vrstami medijev največje zaupanje izkazali Hrvaški radioteleviziji. Hipotezo, da ljudje ne 
verjamejo medijem in informacijam v zvezi Agrokora, ki se objavljajo v medijih, lahko 
potrdim na podlagi podatkov, ki sem jih dobila od anketirancev, iz katerih je razvidno, da 
ljudje v veliki meri verjamejo medijem, predvsem televiziji. Največje število anketirancev 
(69%) se je izjasnilo, da so zaradi medijev spremenili svoje mnenje o določenem dogodku 
in/ali osebi, ampak celo 74% anketirancev meni, da je največ lažnih vesti povezanih s 
koncernom Agrokor. Vsekakor je treba poudariti, da so vsi anketiranci mnenja, da so mediji 
objavljali lažne vesti glede koncerna Agrokor, in da 13% oseb ne ve, če so takšne novice o tej 
temi sprožene v javnost. Nezaupljivost do medijev in informacij o koncernu je precej velika, 
zato 41% anketirancev meni, da so mediji naškodili ugledu Agrokora. Kljub temu, ljudje nič 
več ne zaupajo Ivici Todoriću in je celo 52% ljudi mnenja, da iza bloga Ivice Todorića ni 
Ivica Todorić, 52% pa je mnenja, da v njegovih blogih ni resnice.  
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Appendix A: Questinnaire 
Za svako pitanje molim da zaokružite ispravnu tvrdnju:   
1. Spol 
M / Ž  
2. Starost 
15 – 20 
20 – 30 
30 – 45 
45 – 60 
60 + 







4. Znate li što su lažne vijesti? 
DA / NE 
5. Mislite li da znate prepoznati lažnu vijest u medijima? 
DA / NE 
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6. Koliko često ste se susreli sa lažnim vijestima u medijima? 
Nijednom 
Jednom 
Dva do pet puta  
Pet do deset puta 
Više od deset puta  
7. U kojoj rubrici, smatrate da se lažne vijesti pojavljuju najčešće  
Politika i gospodarstvo 
Aktualnosti, novosti 
Crna kronika 
Život, zdravlje i lifestyle 
8. Koliko vjerujete u istinitost tvrdnji u navedenim medijima  na skali od 1 do 5 gdje 5 
predstavlja u potpunosti vjerujem, a 1 uopće ne vjerujem.  
Jutarnji list 1 2 3 4 5  
Indeks.hr 1 2 3 4 5 
HRT 1 2 3 4 5  
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11. Da li su vam mediji ikada promijenili percepciju i mišljenje o određenom događaju i / 
ili osobi? 
DA / NE 
12. Smatrate li da je u medijima bilo iznesenih lažnih vijesti na temu koncerna Agrokor? 
DA / NE 
13. Da li su vam ikada mediji promijenili mišljenje ili percepciju o događaju povezanom s 
temom Agrokora? 
DA / NE 
14. Smatrate li da su mediji svojim izvještavanjem naštetili ugledu Agrokora? 
DA / NE 
15. Vjerujete li da iza bloga Ivice Todorića uistinu i stoji Ivica Todorić? 
DA / NE  
16. Vjerujete li da Ivica Todorić u svojim blogovima iznosi istinu?  
DA / NE 
